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Abstract
In this Article the author givesPart I of this Article goes through a brief overview of the
contours of state aid in the European Union. Part II is devoted to a specific aspect of the acquis
communitaire. As it is well known, Article 87 [of the European Community Treaty] identifies the
five preconditions for a State measure to be defined as aid: Transfer of State resources, advantage,
selectivity, distortion of competition, and effect on intra-Community trade. The reflections in this
Part is confined to the first of those conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the ever-growing family of European law, the area of
State aid has been for many years considered the cadet son with
respect to antitrust regulation. Nothing could be further from
the truth, however, both from a practical and constitutional per-
spective. The first aspect is easily disposed of: While the amount
of aid granted is still running high-the total amount in 2005
being C64,000,000,000 1-the last few years have witnessed a
flurry of (legal) activity. First, the number of cases dealt with
every year by the European courts is constantly in double figures;
in 2005, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court")
handed down twenty-one judgments while the Court of First In-
stance ("CFI") disposed of fifty-three cases (including both judg-
ments and orders). One should also add to this the robust action
undertaken by the European Commission in the exercise of its
supervisory powers over national measures and its active policy-
making activities-consisting of guidelines, communications,
bloc exemptions, a code of procedural rules, etc.2
As for the constitutional importance of State aid law, it is
easy to forget that the basic idea of the common market, upon
which the European integration process has largely been based,
is borne out of a series of checks imposed on national economic
policies, to ensure the free flow of trade. Central to this aim is
* Professor of European Union Law, King's College London.
1. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, STATE AID SCOREBOARD: Au-
TUMN 2006 UPDATE, COM (2006) 761 Final, at 7, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/compeifion/stateaid/studies-reports/2006_autumn en.pdf (last visited May
17, 2007).
2. For an overview of the regulatory reach of the Commission, see generally COM-
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2005, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/annual_reports/2005/en.pdf.
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the prohibition imposed upon Member States to directly influ-
ence and affect the market. Thus, the free movement provisions
prohibiting any kind of regulatory measures that could create an
obstacle to the free movement of goods, capital, workers, and
services, and the provisions subjecting State intervention in the
economy to direct limitations, such as the prohibition on mo-
nopolies over goods, the principle of non-discrimination on in-
direct taxes, controls on public undertakings and, most notably,
Articles 87 and 88. These immaculately drafted provisions lay
down both the substantive and procedural conditions that Mem-
ber States have to respect in their financial support of undertak-
ings. As the ECJ has repeatedly held, the European Community
Treaty ("EC Treaty" or "Treaty") provisions refer "to the deci-
sions of Member States by which, in pursuit of their own eco-
nomic and social objectives, they give, by unilateral and autono-
mous decisions, resources to undertakings or other persons or
procure for them advantages intended to encourage the attain-
ment of the economic or social objectives sought."3 State aid is
thus defined as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred
on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authori-
ties. Therefore, subsidies granted to individuals or general mea-
sures open to all enterprises are not covered by Article 87 of the
EC Treaty and do not constitute State aid.
As argued elsewhere, the model of State aid control bears
much more resemblance to the principles of the economic free-
doms than to pure antitrust regulations.4 The ECJ itself has
often remarked that "the provisions relating to the free move-
ment of goods, the repeal of discriminatory tax provisions and
aid have a common objective, namely to ensure the free move-
ment of goods under normal conditions of competition."' The
first-born son is thus State aid and regulation of State public bod-
ies control, and not the competition law provisions contained in
3. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit italiana, Case 61/79,
[1980] E.C.R. 1205, 31.
4. See Andrea Biondi & Piet Eeckhout, State Aids and Barriers to Trade, in THE LAW
OF EC STATE AIDS 103 (2003).
5. Commission v. France, Case 18/84, [1985] E.C.R. 1339, 13; see also Compa-
gnie Commerciale de l'Ouest v. Receveur Principal des Douanes de La Pallice Port,
Joined Cases C-78-83/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-1847; Lornoy v. Belgium, Case C-17/91,
[1992] E.C.R. 1-6523; Commission v. Italy, Case 103/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1759; Commis-
sion v. Ireland, Case 17/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2375; Pabst & Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Old-
enburg, Case 17/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1331.
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the EC Treaty, which only serve to reinforce the creation of a
level playing field between states, by imposing constraints on
companies' behavior. The nature of State aid control is thus "not
just about micro-economic competition between undertakings in
the relevant market but mainly about macro-economic competi-
tion between Member states."6 The celebrated case law on the
application of Article 81(3) on acts of public authorities where
they have an effect on competition is certainly intellectually and
jurisprudentially fascinating, but its importance should not be
overstated.7 As has often been remarked, the system of control
on State economic intervention, sketched in the EC Treaty, is
one of the purestjewels in the European legal system crown. Al-
though the World Trade Organization ("WTO") rules on subsi-
dies are more detailed and seemingly more comprehensive, the
European regulatory framework has certainly proven to be more
effective and significant.8 It is also well known that in other
loosely free trade related systems, there is perhaps a lamentable
lack of any specific regulation of financial intervention by the
State. For instance, despite the wide application given by the
U.S. Supreme Court to the interstate commerce clause, this has
never been stretched so as to cover subsidies granted by the
State.9 The shine of the State aid jewel has been preserved by
the massive effort made by the European Commission, both in
its policy-making activities and in the exercise of its power of su-
pervision over Members States' conduct. The contribution of
both European Community ("EC") courts has proven, however,
to be essential.
This Article will thus be devoted to a specific aspect of the
acquis communitaire. As it is well known, Article 87 identifies the
five preconditions for a State measure to be defined as aid:
Transfer of State resources, advantage, selectivity, distortion of
6. Jos6 Buendia Sierra, Not Like This: Some Sceptical Remarks on the "Refined Economic
Approach" in State Aid, in Conference Material "The Law of EC State Aid," EUR. STATE
AID L.Q. (2006).
7. See Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi v. Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del
Mercato, Case C,198/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-8055; Van Eycke v. Aspa, Case 267/86, [1988]
E.C.R. 4769.
8. See generally GuSTAVO LUENGO HERNANDEZ DE MADRID, REGULATION OF SUBSIDIEs
AND STATE AID IN VITO AND EC LAw: CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw (2007).
9. See Diane P. Wood, Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler Inc.: State Aid from an American
Perspective, 1 EUR. STATE AID L.Q. 3 (2007).
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competition, and effect on intra-Community trade. The reflec-
tions that follow will be confined to the first of those conditions.
I. THE CONTOURS OF STATE AID LAW
Any analysis of State aid law usually begins with a couple of
citations from two "classic" examples of the ECJ case law. The
first is from the 1961 Steenkolenmijnen case,' ° where the Court
held that:
[T] he concept of aid is . . .wider than that of a subsidy be-
cause it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies
themselves, but also interventions which, in various forms,
mitigate the charges which are normally included in the
budget of an undertaking and which, without, therefore, be-
ing subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in
character and have the same effect.''
The second comes from a 1974 decision on whether a reduction
in social charges pertaining to family allowances should not have
been considered aid as it was a measure of internal taxation,
which is reserved to the sovereignty of Member States and a mea-
sure of social nature, which falls outside the scope of Article 87.
The Court held instead that:
[T]he aim of Article [87] is to prevent trade between Mem-
ber States from being affected by benefits granted by public
authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to dis-
tort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods. Accordingly, Article [87] does
not distinguish between the measures of State intervention
concerned by reference to their causes or aims but define
them in relation to their effects. Consequently, the alleged
fiscal nature or social aim of the measure in issue cannot suf-
fice to shield it from the application of Article [87].2
These two dicta fundamentally ensure that many forms of gov-
10. The case concerned the interpretation of the concept of "subsidy or aid"
under Article 4(c) of the European Steel and Coal Community Treaty ("ECSC"), which
reads as follows: "The following are recognised as incompatible with the common mar-
ket for coal and steel and shall accordingly be abolished and prohibited within the
Community, as provided in this Treaty: (c) subsidies or aids granted by States, or spe-
cial charges imposed by States, in any form whatsoever." Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, art. 4(c), Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter
ECSC Treaty].
11. Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority, Case 30/59, [1961] E.C.R. 1, 19.
12. Italy v. Commission, Case 173/73, [1974] E.C.R. 709, 1 13.
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ernmental financial assistance fall within the scope of the Treaty
provisions by clarifying that the notion of aid should not be re-
stricted to that of a subsidy, and that the aim of particular mea-
sures should not be considered relevant, since it is only the ef-
fects on the market that are taken into account when consider-
ing whether a measure constitutes State aid. The year 1974 is of
particular importance as the year of the Dassonville decision
where the Court held that all national provisions capable of hin-
dering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Com-
munity trade were to be considered as a violation of the Treaty. i"
By universal agreement the novelty of that case has been identi-
fied as the shift in emphasis from the aim of the measure to its
effect. This is certainly true; however, as has been well-explained
by Weiler, the true revolution was that the Court extended the
realm of EC law to cover not just any national rules that effec-
tively denied access to the market, but also any regulatory mea-
sure which could produce an effect on trade.'4 The same rea-
soning should be applicable to State aid law. Steenkolenmijnen
and Italy v. Commission are very strong judicial warnings that a
Member State cannot simply circumvent Treaty rules by "label-
ling" a measure as either not directly emanating from the State,
or not pertaining to a particular non-trade related policy. Thus,
the Court was able to qualify as aid many measures which do not
"physically" require the direct financing of undertakings, or
measures that the State has tried to qualify as a general policy.' 5
Nonetheless, the ECJ case law has never meant that virtually
every State action should be classified as aid. The parallel with
Dassonville can and might be stretched a bit further. Immedi-
ately after the famous dictum, the Court acknowledged that, es-
pecially in the absence of Community rules in a specific area, the
13. See Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837.
14. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and
Context in the Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 360-64
(1999).
15. For example, direct subsidies, loans, guarantees, exemption from the ordinary
rules concerning taxes and social contributions, under-price sales, capital injections,
provision of market research and advertising activities or logistical and commercial as-
sistance, payment of outstanding wages or redundancy costs, or exemption from the
normal application of insolvency rules. See, e.g., France v. Commission, Case C-251/97,
[1999] E.C.R. 1-6639; Demenagements-Manutention Transport SA, Case C-256/97,
[1999] E.C.R. 1-3913; France v. Commission, Case C-241/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4551;
Banco Exterior de Espana v. Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Case C-387/92, [1994] E.C.R.
1-877.
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regulatory powers of member states should be preserved, if nec-
essary, for the attainment of certain public policies. The same
balancing model is applicable to the regulation of aid. The ob-
jective of the Treaty provisions is not to deprive Member States
of any kind of powers in delineating economic and social
polices, it is to prevent the conferral by the State of an unduly
and anticompetitive advantage in a specific undertaking. Thus,
the Treaty provides in Article 87, paragraphs 2 and 3, a list of
derogations that the European Commission can take into ac-
count when considering whether a certain type of aid is compati-
ble with EC law. Further, from its very beginning the case law
has been incredibly respectful of the Treaty provisions; the
Court clarified that in order to be considered as aid, a State mea-
sure would still have to satisfy all of the cumulative requirements
listed by Article 87(1): advantage, selectivity, transfer of State
resources, distortion of competition, and effect on intra-Com-
munity trade.' 6 The notion of aid has therefore always been
confined by the applicability of these five preconditions, which
have been continuously redefined and revisited by the Commu-
nity courts.
II. AIDS "GRANTED BY THE MEMBER STATE OR THROUGH
STATE RESOURCES"-THE CASE
LAW RECONSTRUCTION
The first precondition for the applicability of Article 87(1)
is that the aid should be granted by the Member State or
through State resources. As proposed by Judge Bo Vesterdorf,'7
a mental flow chart on this criterion should comprise four ques-
tions:
(I Where does the money come from?
(2) Does the state directly or indirectly control the resources
in question?
(3) If yes, is the transfer of the resources imputable to the
state?
(4) Are there any exceptions applicable?' 8
16. See Belgium v. Commission, Case C-142/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-959.
17. See Bo Vesterdorf, A Further Comment on the New State Aid Concept as This Concept
Continues to Be Reshaped, 3 EUR. STATE AID L.Q. 393, 398 (2005).
18. This question deals mainly with compensation for the performance of a service
of general economic interest. See Altmark Trans GmbH v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Alt-
mark GmbH, Case C-280/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7747.
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These questions seem rather straightforward, yet they keep on
coming back before the European judicature. One of the long-
est disputes in the area of State aid law has always been between
two reconstructions of the first sentence of Article 87(1), the so-
called "alternative" or "cumulative" test. For years, the European
Commission tended to consider the two conditions as "alterna-
tives"; that is to say, any measures financed through State re-
sources or in any way attributable to the State, granted by Mem-
ber States, has to be considered aid. 9 This extensive interpreta-
tion tends to read Article 87(1) in terms of the lex generalis being
that any measure which confers an economic advantage on a
specific undertaking, and which is the result of conduct attribu-
table to the State, constitutes State aid regardless of whether
there is a "tangible" transfer of resources. Such a transfer, then,
becomes a residual category-the lex specialis. In the words of
Advocate General Darmon, Article 87(1) relates to the public
nature of aid, namely "to the authority which adopted the mea-
sure-the State and its agencies-thereby disrupting normal
market conditions, [rather] than to the body or the person fi-
nancing it."2 ° The other thesis, the so-called "cumulative" recon-
struction, reads the two expressions together and signifies that
aid must be financed through State resources and that the dis-
tinction between aid granted by a State and aid granted through
State resources serves to bring within the definition of "aid" not
just aid granted directly by the State, but also aid granted by pub-
lic or private bodies designated or established by the State. In
short, the money has to come definitively from the State. As
early as 1978, the Court indicated that the burden on the State
finances had to be considered as a prerequisite for the applica-
tion of Article 87.21 In the Van Tiggele case, the Court held that a
national measure, which fixed the minimum retail price for spir-
its, did not amount to a burden on State finance-the only bur-
den eventually being shouldered by consumers. As elucidated
by Advocate General Capotorti, the possible disadvantages to im-
19. See generally Kelyn Bacon, State Aids and General Measures, 17 Y.B EUR. L. 269
(1997); Marco M. Slotboom, State Aid in Community Law: A Broad or Narrow Definition?,
20 EUR. L. REV. 289 (1995). For more on this interpretation, see Ian Winter, Redefining
the Notion of State Aid in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, [2004] C.M.L.R. 475.
20. Sloman Neptun Schiffaharts v. Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Nep-
tun Schiffahrts, Joined Cases C-72 & C-73/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-887, 40 [hereinafter
Sloman Neptun].
21. See Netherlands v. Van Tiggele, Case 82/77, [1978] E.C.R. 25.
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ported spirits should have been assessed under the free move-
ment of goods provisions rather than over-stretching the defini-
tion of State aid. Although it could be argued that the Court of
Justice has, at times, been tempted to embrace the alternative
approach,22 the now well-established case law clearly indicates
that the measure must always involve a burden on the State. In
the much-criticized triade of labor law cases Sloman Neptun, Vis-
cido, and Kirshammer-Hack, the Court clearly upheld the cumula-
tive thesis. In Sloman Neptun, the ECJ held that the partial non-
application of German employment legislation to foreign crews
of vessels flying the German flag did not constitute a grant of aid
to the ship owners. 23 This is because:
[T]he system at issue does not seek, through its object and
general structure, to create an advantage which would consti-
tute an additional burden for the State or the above-men-
tioned bodies, but only to alter in favour of shipping under-
takings the framework within which contractual relations are
formed between those undertakings and their employees. 24
Similarly, in Kirshammer-Hack, the Court concluded that the
exclusion of small businesses from a legal regime requiring pay-
ment of compensation in the event of unfair dismissals did not
amount to the grant of aid to the businesses concerned, reason-
ing that it "does not entail any direct or indirect transfer of State
resources to those businesses but derives solely from the legisla-
ture's intention to provide a specific legislative framework for
working relationships between employers and employees and to
avoid imposing on those businesses financial constraints which
might hinder their development. 21 5 Lastly, in the Viscido case,
the measure at issue allowed only one undertaking, Ente Poste
Italiane, to derogate from the general rules under Italian law that
the employment contracts should be of indeterminate duration
and that the recruitment of staff under fixed-term contracts
should be permitted.21 Contrary to the previous two cases, the
22. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case 290/83, [1985] E.C.R. 439; Norddeut-
sches Vieh-und Fleischkontor Herbert Will v. Bundesanstalt Fur Landwirtschaftliche
Marktordnung, Joined Cases 213-215/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3583.
23. See Sloman Neptun, [1993] E.C.R. 1-887, 29.
24. Id. 21.
25. Kirshainmer-Hack v. Sidal, Case C-189/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6185, 17.
26. See Viscido v. Ente Poste Italiane, Joined Cases C-52-54/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-
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Court did not refer to the regulatory aim of the legislation but
merely concluded that "the non-application of generally applica-
ble legislation concerning fixed-term employment contracts to a
single undertaking does not involve any direct or indirect trans-
fer of State resources to that undertaking. 2
7
The question between the alternative and cumulative inter-
pretations was definitively closed in the Preussen Elektra case.28
In this case, the Court held that an obligation imposed on
private electricity suppliers to purchase electricity produced
from renewable energy sources at fixed minimum prices did not
involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources to un-
dertakings which produced this type of electricity. In a rather
terse paragraph, the Court held that:
[O]nly advantages granted directly or indirectly through
State resources are to be considered aid within the meaning
of Article 92(1). The distinction made in that provision be-
tween aid granted by a Member State and aid granted
through State resources does not signify that all advantages
granted by a State, whether financed through State resources
or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within
that definition both advantages which are granted directly by
the State and those granted by a public or private body desig-
nated or established by the State ....
The Court also roundly rejected an argument presented by the
Commission that in order to preserve the effectiveness of State
aid supervision, the duty of loyal co-operation under Article 10
made it necessary for the concept of State aid to be interpreted
in such a way as to include support measures which are man-
dated by the State, but financed by private undertakings. The
Court firmly replied that the EC Treaty provision, in contrast
with other areas of EC law,3 ° cannot be used to extend the scope
of Article 87 to State conduct that does not fall within it.
These decisions have been extensively criticized.3' There
are generally two strands of criticism: First, it is the accusation
that the Court has in reality taken into account the specific aim
27. Id. 14.
28. See PreussenElektra v. Schleswag, Case C-379/98, [20011 E.C.R. 1-2099.
29. Id. 58.
30. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
31. See Bacon, supra note 19, at 313-17; Malcolm Ross, State Aids: Maturing into a
Constitutional Problem, 15 Y.B EUR. L. 79, 82 (1996); Slotboom, supra note 19, at 294-98.
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of the national measures in question-labor law/environmental
law-thus performing a transplant of ajustificatory element into
the definition of aid. Secondly, because State aid control is es-
sentially there to ensure fairness of competition law, the primary
concern is that of preventing any distortions of competition.
The only issue should be, then, whether a certain measure can
have the effect of favoring a certain undertaking. Whether the
advantage is conferred through private and not public resources
is thus irrelevant. Preussen Elektra is one case in point. As has
been argued by the European Commission, the measure in ques-
tion had an anticompetitive effect in two ways. First, as far as
electricity competitors were concerned, the German legislation
had the effect of granting a considerable amount of aid to pro-
ducers of electricity from renewable sources. As the amount of
that aid was determined on the basis of the amount of electricity
produced and of average sales prices of the previous year, pro-
ducers of electricity from renewable sources could unilaterally
increase the aid to which they were entitled by increasing pro-
duction and by reducing production costs. The mechanism also
sheltered them from any risk of overcapacity or price fluctua-
tions. Secondly, the producers of electricity from conventional
sources themselves would end up subsidising the aid measure in
question. Paradoxically, the distortion of competition might be
greater where the cost of the measure is borne by competitors of
the aided undertakings and not by the general public.
A. Aids "Granted by the Member State or Through State Resources"-
The Constitutional Motive
The two main criticisms above are in reality a single one
based on the assumption that an extensive interpretation of
State aid provisions is preferable as such an interpretation will
guarantee a more effective economic and objective assessment
of the effect of the measure on the competitive market. Any
kind of possible justifications for the State action should only be
assessed through the mechanism provided by Article 87,
paragraphs (2) and (3), or through block exemptions for certain
wide categories of aid.
While these arguments have considerable weight-perhaps
the Court itself could have tried to be equally straightforward in
its analysis (particularly with reference to the labor law
1435
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cases) 32 -it is argued that the approach taken by the ECJ and
later followed by the CFI is substantially correct.
The most convincing rationale for such an approach was de-
veloped by Advocate General Jacobs in several of his opinions-
in particular in Viscido and Preussen Elektra-which were perhaps
later influenced by academic writings. The most notable of
these writings is perhaps the article by Professor Paul Davies enti-
tled, Market Integration and Social Policy in the Court of Justice.33
Both Jacobs and Davis have argued that adopting a cumulative
test would increase legal certainty and would have ensured the
preservation of a certain necessary degree of regulatory power
for Member States.
Advocate General Jacobs and Professor Davies's views are
not iconoclastic, but are very firmly based on the kind of regula-
tory model sketched out by the EC Treaty. Far from being an
ultra deregulatory system, the European single market has always
been structured on a series of checks and balances between the
effective application of trade rules and the preservation of public
values-preservations which are allocated both to supranational
institutions and to Member State authorities.34 On the one
hand, it is in fact up to the European institutions in their task of
legislative harmonization to take into account several public
aims, such as environmental law, a high level of public health,
and even the protection of human rights.35 In State aid law, the
system sketched by Article 87 allows the European Commission
to take into account a series of aims and values that would cause
a measure, which would ordinarily qualify as an aid, to fall
outside the scope of the Treaty. On the other hand, the Treaty
allows Member States an ample margin for pursuing their legiti-
32. See, e.g., Andrea Biondi & Luca Rubini, State Aid Law: Between Social Objectives
and Public Services, in SOCIAL WELFARE AND EU LAw 79 (2005); Barry J. Rodger, State
Aid-A Fully Level PlayingField?, 20 EuR. CoMPETITIoN L. REv. 251, 254 (1999); Malcolm
Ross, State Aids and National Courts: Definitions and Other Problems-A Case of Premature
Emancipation?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 401, 413 (2000); Slotboom, supra note 19, at
292-95.
33. See Paul Davies, Market Integration and Social Policy in the Court of Justice, 24 IN-
DUS. L.J. 49, 58-62 (1995).
34. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the
European Constitution: Economic Freedom and Political Rights, 3 EUR. L.J. 55, 61-65 (1997).
35. For judicial approval, see The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte Brit-
ish American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. & Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Case C-491/01,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-11453, 62; Arnold Andre GmbH & Co. KG v. Landrat des Kreises
Herford, Case C-434/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-11825, 33.
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mate policies. All economic freedoms are coupled with a long
list of derogations, and competition rules are subject to the gen-
eral justification for services of general economic interests found
in Article 86. Moreover, apart from allowing Member States to
rely on certain public aims to derogate from the Treaty prohibi-
tions, the acquis communitaire has always acknowledged that
there are indeed certain areas of economic regulation where,
due to their being neither subject nor partially subject to supra-
national harmonization, States not only can, but should, pre-
serve their powers. In one of the more criticized, but in our view
constitutionally compelling, paragraphs of its case law history,
the ECJ, faced with an over extensive application of the notion
of a measure having equivalent effect on the basis of Article 28,
reaffirmed that the European model of economic integration is
not based on an entirely deregulatory policy.
In the Keck3 6 decision, the Court held that national provi-
sions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements are
not likely to hinder intra-Community trade, so long as they apply
to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and
so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Mem-
ber States. The Court further pointed out that the EC rules
could not be abused by traders wishing to challenge "any rules
whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where
such rules are not aimed at products from other Member
States." 7 This is a recurrent story. After an initial period of ex-
pansion, usually aimed at dismantling the most obvious trade
barriers, comes the acknowledgment of the necessity of an outer
limit. Once the "all out-rallying cry against the ethos of protec-
tionism" has been exhausted, there is an eventual return to nor-
mality."8 Article 28 and the Keck case law exemplify this trend but
other decisions can be mentioned. Recently, the Court signaled
that the Keck test could be transposed to the freedom to provide
services. 9 In two decisions-both concerning whether the im-
36. See Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267-268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-06097.
37. Id. 14.
38. Weiler, supra note 14, at 362.
39. This is the author's opinion. Contra Alpine Investments v. Minister van
Financi4en, Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141, 33-39; Konsumentombudsmannen v.
Gourmet International Products, Case C-405/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1795, 36-39 (raising
the question of whether the Keck test could be applied to the freedom to provide ser-
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position of a municipal tax could be considered as an obstacle to
the free movement of services-the Court held Article 49 to be
inapplicable. The Court found that measures, the only effect of
which was to create additional costs with respect to the service in
question, and which affect in the same way the provision of ser-
vices between Member States and those within one Member
State, did not fall within the scope of the Treaty. Even in the
field of competition law, the Court has carefully redesigned the
boundaries of antitrust applicability. In cases such as Albany, re-
garding collective agreements between management and labor
on sectorial pension schemes, and Cisal, which dealt with a com-
pulsory insurance scheme, the Court held, despite acknowledg-
ing that certain restrictions of competition were inherent in the
agreements between organizations representing employers and
workers, that these agreements did not, by reason of their nature
and purpose, fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of the
Treaty.4"
The connection between this long list of cases is the ac-
knowledgment of the need to ensure that EC law is not exces-
sively overstretched. The courts have done this by adopting a
very practical approach to the problem. They seek to assess the
economic and legal context in which the State measure was
adopted, the objective to be attained by the measure, its effects,
and at the same time, the structure of the market concerned,
and the actual conditions in which the measure functions.
As concerns State aid law, interpreting the expression
"granted by the State or through State resources" under the cu-
mulative interpretation serves the same purpose of balancing le-
gitimate State policies against the needs of the single market.
This was explicitly and candidly affirmed by Advocate General
Jacobs in his opinion in Viscido, where he argued that an exten-
sive interpretation of the notion of State resources would have
meant an investigation into all national labor law regimes,
which, in turn, would have entailed "an inquiry on the basis of
vices); see also J.L. Da Cruz Vilaiza, On the Application of Keck in the Field of Free Provision of
Services, in SERVICES AND FREE MOVEMENT IN EU LAW 25 (2002).
40. See Albany International v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie,
Case C-67/96 [1999] E.C.R. 1-5751; Cisal v. INAIL, Case C-218/00 [2002] E.C.R. 1-691,
22; see also FENIN v. Commission, Case T-319/99, [2003] E.C.R. 11-357. See generally
Alexander Winterstein, Nailing theJellyfish: Social Security and Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R.
324 (1999).
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the Treaty alone into the entire social and economic life of a
Member State."41 In the same vein, in Preussen Elektra, the funda-
mental reason for adopting the cumulative approach is con-
tained in paragraph 107 of Advocate Jacobs Opinion:
[T] he more extensive interpretation would oblige the Mem-
ber States, affected undertakings, the Commission, the na-
tional courts and ultimately the Community Courts to decide
in respect of all legislation regulating the relationship be-
tween enterprises whether it does confer selective advantages
on certain undertakings within the meaning of Article 87(1).
Since such an assessment is a difficult exercise with an uncer-
tain outcome, it seems preferable that legislation regulating
the relationship between private actors is as a matter of prin-
ciple excluded from the scope of the State aid rules.
As for Davis, he makes a very explicit comparison between the
judgment in Keck and the Sloman Neptun line of case law. He
argues that in both situations the question is whether or not the
decisions should have further expanded Article 28 and Article
87. In both cases, the Court opted for the exclusion in limine of
the national measures at stake.42 This kind of argument is also
embraced by Advocate General Poiares Maduro. In a recent
opinion, he argues that not every national measure that has the
effect of giving an economic advantage to undertakings and that
affects the competitive environment in the single market should
be treated as State aid. He proposes to reconstruct the case law
of the ECJ on the notion of State resources by implying a distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, distortions resulting from the
adoption of measures to regulate economic activities and, on the
other, distortions caused by a transfer of public resources to cer-
tain undertakings:
Only the latter are such as to affect the competitive environ-
ment. The former must be accepted in as much as their only
purpose is to establish the parameters within which business
is carried on and goods and services produced. The reason
for the distinction is clear to see. The Court is seeking to
41. Viscido v. Ente Poste Italiane, Joined Cases C-52-54/97, [1998] E.C.R. 2629,
16.
42. There is a difference between the two decisions. As for Article 28 EC, the
question is on the meaning of "restrictions"; as for Article 87 EC, the question is
whether there is a sufficiently close connection with the State. See Ross, supra note 31, at
83. This is indeed true; however, it does not make the "constitutional" argument less
compelling.
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guard against the scope of the Community rules being broad-
ened to cover distortions of competition that are simply the
result of differences in legislative policy between Member
States. That caution stems from a concern not to encroach
on powers reserved to the Member States. There is a danger
that over-extension of the State aid rules might result in all
economic policy decisions of Member States being brought
under the scrutiny of the Community authorities, without any
distinction being made between direct interventions in the
market and general measures to regulate economic activities.
Clearly, the Community's State aid rules are not intended to
be used to vet all legislative decisions of Member States for
their impact on competition in the internal market. Their
purpose is to identify only those distortions of competition
brought about by a Member State seeking to give a particular
advantage to certain undertakings by measures that depart
from its overall policy approach.4 3
Although it is not good practice to second-guess judges' inten-
tions, it is still possible to discern a clear approval of such an
approach in the extra-judicial writings of the President of the
CFI. Apart from citing large passages of Advocate General Ja-
cobs opinion, Judge Vesterdorf described cases, such as Preussen
Elektra, as fundamental in ensuring a further degree of legal cer-
tainty in the area of State aid law.44
In conclusion, the case law requires a direct involvement on
the part of the State in favoring a certain undertaking. Such a
reconstruction does not mean that the Courts would not be
alerted to possible schemes that Member States could concoct to
escape the Treaty provisions. Take, for instance, the question of
tax exemptions as State aid. The Community courts have repeat-
edly held that the direct intervention of the State should not be
excluded even when the aid is granted not directly, but through
third parties. Thus it is not necessary, in order to find the exis-
tence of intervention by means of State resources in favour of an
undertaking, that the undertaking must be the direct recipi-
ent."5
When a direct intervention cannot be established, however,
43. Enirsorse v. Sotocarbo, Case C-237/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-2843, 44-46.
44. See Bo Vesterdorf, A Further Comment on the New State Aid Concept as This Concept
Continues to Be Reshaped, 3 EuR. STATE AID L.Q. 393.
45. See Germany v. Commission, Case C-156/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-6857; Confedera-
tion nationale du Credit mutuel v. Commission, Case T-93/02, [2005] E.C.R. 11-143.
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it might be possible to speak of State aid law in terms of a Euro-
pean-style rule of reason.46 As has been made well known by a
series of cases, the ECJ has acknowledged that not every agree-
ment between undertakings, or every decision of an association
of undertakings, which restricts the freedom of action of the par-
ties, is a breach of the Treaty provisions. The Court admitted
that in taking into account the overall context in which a deci-
sion was taken or in which it produces its effects and, more spe-
cifically, its objectives, one should consider whether the conse-
quential effects which restrict competition are inherent in the
pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to them.47 For
instance in Deliege the question was whether selection rules for
sporting events could be regarded as an obstacle to the freedom
to provide a service. In this judgment, the Court held that al-
though the measure in question had some restrictive effects on
free movement and, although selection rules inevitably have the
effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament,
"such a limitation is inherent in the conduct of an international
high-level sports event, which necessarily involves certain selec-
tion rules or criteria being adopted." Therefore, the measure
did not constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide ser-
vices prohibited by Article 49 of the Treaty.48 In Wouters, the
ECJ, applying the same test to competition and free movement
of services, found that rules on multi-disciplinary practices, "de-
spite the effects restrictive of competition that are inherent in
it," were deemed necessary for the proper practice of the legal
profession, as organized in the Member State concerned.4 9
More recently, in a case dealing with anti-doping rules, the
Court established that, although the rules might have the effect
of limiting athletes' freedom of action, "such a limitation is in-
herent in the organization and proper conduct of competitive
sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between
athletes." '
46. See Giorgio Monti, Article 81 and Public Policy, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1057,
1086 (2002).
47. See Wouters v. Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Case C-309/99,
[2002] ECR 1-1577.
48. See Deliege v. Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL,
Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-2549, 64.
49. Wouters, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1577, 3.
50. Meca-Medina v. Commission, Case C,519/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-0699, 45.
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As for Article 87(1), the inherent restriction approach can
be seen as a possible further dimension to the State aid test;51
whereby, even if the measure is loosely attributable to the State
and might still produce certain anticompetitive effects on the
market, it has to be recognized that in the absence of an effec-
tive burden on the State the effects produced are merely inher-
ent in the organization and the proper conduct of national eco-
nomic policies; therefore, such a measure cannot constitute aid.
This seems to be the approach that is emerging from the courts'
case law. For instance, in a series of cases dealing with the Italian
special administration procedure for large companies in difficul-
ties, the ECJ refused to classify as aid the possible loss of tax reve-
nue for the State resulting from legislation on court-supervised
recovery schemes and insolvency. The Court held that:
[Such a] consequence is an inherent feature of any statutory
system laying down a framework for relations between an in-
solvent undertaking and the general body of creditors, and
the existence of an additional financial burden borne directly
or indirectly by the public authorities as a means of granting a
particular advantage to the undertakings concerned may not
automatically be inferred therefrom. 2
The Court, therefore, recognized that the effect of the State's
policies was merely to establish the parameters within which busi-
ness is carried on and goods and services produced.
B. Aids "Granted by the Member State or Through State Resources"-
The Practical Application
Once the general principle has been established, that is to
say, that the distinction between aid granted by a State and aid
granted through State resources serves to bring within the defi-
nition of aid not only aid granted directly by the State, but also
aid granted by public or private bodies designated or established
by the State, the Courts have to still face questions: Does the
State directly or indirectly control the resources in questions? If
yes, is the transfer of the resources imputable to the State? Once
51. This is also the reconstruction albeit in the context of social security laws. See
Erika Szyszcak, State Intervention and the Internal Market, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 235 (2004).
52. Ecotrade SrI v. Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola SpA, Case C-200/97, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-7907, 36; see Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA v.
Int'l Factors Italia SpA, Case C-295/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3735.
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again the Community Courts have provided a series of guide-
lines and criteria to determine the imputability of the measure
to the State. Before embarking on a discussion of those criteria,
however, it is significant to note that there is a clear link on this
point between the case law on imputability and the definition of
"granted by the State and through State resources." The ECJ
has, in fact, firmly established that the imputability of certain
measures to the State should never be presumed, but always
proven. In the case of Stardust Maritime, the Commission consid-
ered that various financing measures and bank guarantees
granted by two subsidiaries of Credit Lyonnais and then by the
Consortium de R~alisation, to the French pleasure boat charter-
ing firm Stardust Marine, had to be considered as aid. It should
be noted that, at the time, Credit Lyonnais and its subsidiaries
were owned and controlled by the French State. The Court in its
judgment severely criticized the Commission for inferring the
imputability of the financial assistance to the State from the
mere fact that the banks were controlled by the State. The fact
that the decision had been taken by a public undertaking cannot
automatically signify that the public authorities [were] involved,
in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures. Thus,
the public character of a certain measure is not per se sufficient
to subject a regulatory act to EU law. It must be demonstrated
that there was an actual exercise of such a special public power.
As in the case law on fundamental freedoms,53 what the Court
requires is a concrete assessment of State involvement and
whether it can have an impact on the internal market. Such a
functional test is also clearly consistent with that developed by
the Court on the notion of "undertaking" within the meaning of
the Community competition rules. The now established case law
is firmly based on a functional test, as the Court focuses on the
type of activity performed rather than on the characteristics of
the actors who perform it, the social objectives associated with it,
or the regulatory or funding arrangements to which it is subject
in a particular Member State.54 The emphasis is not merely
placed on the criteria of the offer of goods and services, but on
53. See generally Apple & Pear Dev. Council v. Comm'ns of Customs and Excise,
Case 102/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1443.
54. See AOK Bundesverband v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft, Joined Cases C-264, C-354-
55/01, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2493, 46-49; Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-1979.
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the effective participation in the market of a specific entity.5 5
Likewise, the functional test in the area of State aid requires
then, evidence that public powers have been concretely exer-
cised in the market place.
The ECJ in Stardust Maritime further proceeded towards a
systematization of its previous case law and provided a non-ex-
haustive list of possible indicators that may have to be used to
satisfy the functional test: the fact that the body in question
could not take the contested decision without taking account of
the requirements of the public authorities;56 or the fact that,
apart from factors of an organic nature, which linked the public
undertakings to the State, those undertakings, through the inter-
mediary to which aid had been granted, had to take account of
directives issued by the State;5 7 its integration into the structures
of the public administration; the nature of its activities and the
exercise of the latter on the market in normal conditions of
competition with private operators; the legal status of the under-
taking (in the sense of its being subject to public law or ordinary
company law); the intensity of the supervision exercised by the
public authorities over the management of the undertaking; or
any other indicator showing, in the particular case, an involve-
ment by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or
the unlikelihood of their not being involved; having regard also
to the compass of the measure, its content, or the conditions
which it contains.
Such a long list might not be pleasant to read, and such a
flexible approach can of course run the risk of being too flexi-
ble, but it is evident that the Court has made a conscious effort
to provide some form of benchmark that can be used by all the
interested parties: Member States, the Commission, and private
undertakings. The recent case law seems also to stick rather
closely to the ECJ indications. An interesting example is Deutsche
55. See Firma Ambulanz Glockner v. Landkreis Sudwestpfalz, Case C-475/99,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-8089; Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Joined
Cases C-180-84/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-6451; see also Aeroports de Paris v. Commission,
Case C-82/01, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9297. See generally Victoria Loun, "Undertaking" as ajuris-
dictional Element for the Application of EC Competition Rules, 29 (2) LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTE-
GRATION 143 (2002).
56. See van der Kooy BV v. Commission, Joined Cases 67-68, 70/85, [1988] E.C.R.
219, 37.
57. See Italy v. Commission, Case C-303/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1433, 12; Italy v.
Commission, Case C-305/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1603, 9114.
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Bahn v. Commission." In this case the German national railway
undertaking challenged a decision of the European Commission
not to consider a tax exemption provided by German law with
respect to aviation fuel. Deutsche Bahn asserted, of course, that
such a measure had the effect of favoring air transport against
rail transport (in particular high-speed trains). The German tax
measure was, however, clearly implementing a Directive on the
harmonization of the structures of excise duties on mineral oils.
Thus, according to the CFI, as the German measure had to be
considered a proper transposition of EC law, it did not satisfy the
imputability test, as the Member State was only implementing
Community law in accordance with its obligations stemming
from the Treaty. Therefore, the provision at issue was not im-
putable to the German State, but derived from an act of the
Community legislature. Such a decision should not, for obvious
constitutional reasons, be considered as meaning that a State
measure implementing Community legislation will never fall
within the scope of Article 87(1). In the Deutsche Bahn judg-
ment, the CFI reiterated several times that this particular in-
stance dealt with a directive that imposed on Member States a
clear and precise obligation not to levy the harmonized excise
duty on fuel used for the purpose of commercial air navigation,
as found by the ECJ in a previous case.59 Conversely, in other
less straightforward cases, it might be possible to imagine that a
Member State might attempt to play with much looser EC draft-
ing. The Stardust Maritime test would still apply, however, and it
would be for the interested parties to indicate the real imputabil-
ity of the measure on the State.
A slightly more complicated case is the Pearle judgment.6"
The case dealt with an action for a declaration that the imposi-
tion of a levy to launch a collective advertising campaign to pro-
mote the services of opticians, required by the Dutch trade asso-
ciation of opticians, had to be considered as invalid, as such an
imposition would constitute State aid. It should be noted that
Dutch law merely conferred on the trade associations the powers
relevant to the performance of the tasks entrusted to them, in-
cluding those allowing the associations to impose levies on their
58. See Deutsche Bahn v. Commission, Case T-351/02, [2006] E.C.R. 11-1047.
59. See Braathens Sverige v. Riksskatteverket, Case C-346/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3419.
60. See Pearle v. Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten, Case C-345/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
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members to meet their costs and to finance the operation of the
organization. The Court first reaffirmed that, even if the trade
association were to be considered a public body, the funding for
the advertising campaign was collected from its members and
did not constitute an additional burden for the State or that
body. The Court also placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that,
in reality, the initiative for the organization and operation of
that advertising campaign came from a private association of op-
ticians, and not from the Trade Association. Thus, the Board of
the Trade Association "served merely as a vehicle for the levying
and allocating of resources collected for a purely commercial
purpose previously determined by the trade and which had
nothing to do with a policy determined by the Netherlands au-
thorities."6
As correctly observed by Judge Vesterdorf, although the
judgment seems to suggest that the relevant criteria for exclud-
ing State imputability had to be considered, the fact that the
measure had been taken at the initiative of a private association,
should, in reality, be irrelevant. Otherwise the Court's findings
in Preussen Elektra-a case dealing with a measure introduced by
legislation-would be called into question. The Pearle case
should, therefore, be understood in terms of imputability. The
initiative of the measure (public or private) does of course have
to be taken into consideration, but only insofar as it is one of the
factors to be taken into account when deciding whether or not
the measure is imputable on the State.6 2
III. SOME BRIEF CONCLUSIONS
The recent case law of the EC courts, especially on the defi-
nition of "State" and "State resources" can certainly be consid-
ered as rather restrained. However, this restraint, far from being
a retreat, is a necessary refinement of the concept of aid, which
will lead to a more balanced approach and further legal cer-
tainty. There are still problems with this approach. Most nota-
bly, such a reconstruction could inspire Member States to come
up with very creative forms of mechanisms, which compel private
61. Id. 1 37.
62. See the positive assessment in Leigh Hancher, A Pearl of Wisdom, 4 EUR. STATE
AID L.Q. 363 (2004).
2007] SOME REFLECTIONS ON "STATE RESOURCES"
sector enterprises to alleviate the costs of certain undertakings.63
The author still believes that those dangers do not outweigh the
beneficial effects on legal certainty and on a possible excessive
deregulation that the courts' case law brings about.
In a rather recent and ambitious consultation paper enti-
tled The State Aid Action Plan, the European Commission has
adopted as a motto for any future policies the "less and better
targeted aid." The slogan identifies the need for a more "re-
fined economic approach" in order to improve the level of cer-
tainty and effectiveness for the notion of aid.64 In particular, in
appraising the compatibility of State aid with European law, the
economic assessments, both potential and actual, should be
taken into account. One key element in that respect is the analy-
sis of market failures, such as externalities, imperfect informa-
tion, or coordination problems, which may be the reasons why a
market does not achieve the desired objectives of common inter-
est. This is particularly true if the failures are of an economic
nature. In those cases, identifying the market failure at stake will
help to better evaluate whether State aid could be justified and is
acceptable, whether it represents the most appropriate solution,
and how it should be implemented to achieve the desired objec-
tive without distorting competition and trade to an extent con-
trary to the common interest.
Without even questioning the importance of an economic
approach, it is argued that the case law on State aid and, in par-
ticular, on the notion of State and State resources, has been con-
stantly characterized by a very practical but flexible approach.
Constantly refining and improving the definition of aid has
somehow better achieved the same kind of results that the Com-
mission attributes to economics. Such case law-together with
its inaccuracies, uncertainties, and plainly confused decisions-is
thus best understood with reference to the counterpart develop-
ments in the field of internal market law, equally characterized
63. See the arguments developed by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in his
Opinion in the Enirisorse case where he reaffirms the importance of coupling the analy-
sis on the notion of State resources with a careful application of the other requirements
of the notion of aid, most notably that of selectivity. See Enirisorse SpA v. Sotacarbo
SpA, Case C-237/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-2843, 44-53.
64. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, STATE AID ACrION PLAN-LESS
AND BETTER TARGETED STATE AID: A ROADMAP FOR STATE AID REFORM 2005-2009, COM
(2005) 107 Final, 18; see also Philip Lowe, Some Reflections on the European Commission's
State Aid Policy, 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 57 (2006).
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by a practical and flexible approach and intimately clear and re-
spectful interpretation of the EC Treaty provisions. As Judge
Vesterdorf has argued extra-judicially, the recent case law on
State aid law identifies a trend which tends to narrow the scope
of Article 87(1). In his view, such a trend should be welcomed,
as it contributes to more legal certainty and would help all play-
ers involved-undertakings, national authorities, and national
courts as well as the Commission and the Community Courts. In
short, a trend which means "less and better targeted aid."
